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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ajic.2015.06.016An outbreak of amikacin- and ciproﬂoxacin-resistant Acinetobacter baumannii ST219 in Tokai University
hospital’s emergency intensive care unit was caused by its colonization in water systems and subsequent
spread through oral care using tap water. The outbreak was successfully controlled after replacement of
the water system and implementation as of daily cleaning of water taps and oral care with a dry method.
It is important to strictly manage the water system in critical care areas.
Copyright  2015 by the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, Inc.
Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Acinetobacter baumannii has the capability of long-term survival
in both dry and wet hospital environments.1 This pathogen pro-
duces a bioﬁlm in water and has been isolated fromwater systems
inmedical facilities.2 We experienced an outbreak of amikacin- and
ciproﬂoxacin-resistant (hereinafter designated drug-resistant [DR])
A baumannii in the emergency intensive care unit (EICU) at Tokai
University Hospital. The drinking tap water had been contaminated
as a reservoir, and thus oral care with this tap water was a route of
transmission. Here we describe the study of this outbreak of DR A
baumannii in the EICU and measures implemented to control
infection.MATERIALS AND METHODS
The advanced emergency and critical care center at Tokai Uni-
versity Hospital accepts approximately 7,000 ambulances and
2,600 admissions per year. The center has a total of 58 beds,, PhD, Department of Emer-
ool of Medicine, Shimokasuya
Umezawa).
ofessionals in Infection Control and
enses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).including a 19-beds EICU, a 36-beds high care unit in the emer-
gency ward, and a 3-beds burn unit.
In the bacteriological investigation of the transmission route,
samples from environmental surfaces of critical and noncritical
areas were collected by wiping with a sterile swab moistened with
sterile normal saline and then inoculated on a 5% sheep’s blood agar
plate (Kyokuto Pharmaceutical Industrial Co, Ltd, Tokyo, Japan).
Bacterial identiﬁcation and antimicrobial sensitivity tests were
performed with the MicroScan WalkAway 96 Plus System
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). To conﬁrm the identiﬁcation of A
baumannii, OXA-51elike genes were examined by polymerase
chain reaction (PCR).
The DR A baumannii isolates were screened for gene homology
according to repetitive-sequence-based (rep) PCR as described
previously.3 The genealogical tree was determined using Den-
droUPGMA (http://genomes.urv.cat/UPGMA/). Multilocus sequence
typing (MLST) was performed as described previously.4 The
ampliﬁcation products were puriﬁed with a Qiagen DNA Puriﬁca-
tion Kit (Qiagen, Venlo, The Netherlands). DNA sequencing was
performed using an ABI PRISM 3730 DNA analyzer (Life Technolo-
gies, Carlsbad, CA). The MLST sequences were uploaded to the A
baumannii MLST sequence type database (http://pubmlst.org/
abaumannii/) to determine the alleles and sequence types. ClonalEpidemiology, Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the
Fig 1. Bacterial investigations of parts of a hand hygiene sink in the EICU. DR A baumannii ST219 was isolated from a hands-free automatic tap (A) and water mixture side of the joint
tube (B), but not the plumbing for either hot water (C) or cold water (D).
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variants.
RESULTS
An outbreak of DR A baumannii was initially recognized in
September 2013 from the aspirated sputum of tracheal intubation
in a series of 3 patients under mechanical ventilation. An epide-
miologic study revealed nothing shared by the 3 patients, including
the patient ﬂow, bed, respirator (closed airway suctioning system),
medical staff, or care areas. Moreover, bacterial investigation of 29
medical staff hands was negative for the detection of DR A bau-
mannii ST219. On environmental screening, DR A baumannii was
detected on hands-free automatic taps of hand hygiene water sinks
in critical areas of the EICU. Each component of the water sinks was
subjected to a bacteriological investigation (Fig 1). DR A baumannii
was isolated from the hands-free automatic tap (Fig 1A) and the
joint tube on the mixture side (Fig 1B), but not from the plumbing
for either hot water or cold water (Fig 1C and D). In addition to hand
hygiene sinks, DR A baumannii was detected from other critical
areas in the EICU environment, including the bronchoscope cabi-
net, the expectoration supporting device (CoughAssist), and plate
sampling test.
On day 23 of the outbreak, use of all 10 hand hygiene water sinks
was prohibited. The sinks, automatic taps, tubes, and hot and cold
water mixture unit were replaced. Cleaning of the water tap was
added to thedaily sinkcleaning routine.Onday26, themethodoforal
care was changed to awaterless technique, performed by wiping the
teeth and gingivawith a swab aftermoistening the tissuewith sterile
water (dry oral care) under the guidance of a dental hygienist. Up to
that time, conventional oral care had beenperformed by nurses using
a toothbrush, toothpaste, and tap water while suctioning (wet oral
care).
Finally, DR A baumannii was detected in sputum from 15 pa-
tients under tracheal intubation without pneumonia, all of whom
had been receivingwet oral care. After the outbreak was controlled,DR A baumannii was not detected in the EICU in routine active
surveillance cultures of any patients over the next 6 months.
DR A baumannii was detected in OXA-51elike genes by rep-PCR.
The rep-PCR analysis revealed a high level of similarity in the pat-
ternsof all patient isolates and thehandhygiene sink samples (hands-
free automatic tap and joint tube) (Fig 2A and B). TheMLSTanalysis of
all isolates of DR A baumannii obtained from the patients and the
water systemrevealed the ST219 strain (Fig 2B). The clinical isolatesof
drug-sensitive A baumannii demonstrated the ST679 strain.
DISCUSSION
In this outbreak of DR A baumannii, oral care using contami-
nated tap water was identiﬁed as a transmission route. A waterless
mouth care method proved useful in preventing further trans-
mission. Oral hygiene is recommended as means of reducing the
incidence of ventilator-associated pneumonia.5 We had been
adopting routine oral care using tap water, which was considered
safe in Japan evenwithout daily cleaning of taps. On the other hand,
water sources in our hospital had recognized reservoirs for water-
transmissible pathogens such as A baumannii.6 Design and daily
cleaning of sink and tap are important for prevention of latent
colonization of Acinetobacter in the hand hygiene sink. To prevent
such infections, wide and deep hand hygiene sinks with hands-free
automatic water taps should be installed.7
MLST typing of DR A baumannii identiﬁed the outbreak of the
ST219 strain. A few cases of infection with A baumannii ST219 have
been reported as well.8 A baumannii ST208 was implicated in an
outbreak in the EICU and burn unit of Tokai University Hospital in
2010, where the air ﬂuidity bed was identiﬁed as a reservoir.9 It is
likely that the EICU environment is readily contaminated with A
baumannii, leading to a risk of contamination in the tapwater in the
hand hygiene sink via the hands of health care workers. To prevent
future outbreaks, it is important to minimize the risk in the wet
environmental reservoir, including sanitary strict management of
water systems, particularly in critical care areas.
Fig 2. Molecular typing of the clinical isolates of DR A baumannii using rep-PCR and MLST. All of the isolates of DR A baumanniiwere subjected to molecular typing using rep-PCR, as
shown in the electrophoretic analysis (A), as well as a genealogical tree and molecular typing using MLST (B). Lanes 1-15 indicate DR A baumannii isolated from the patients. Lanes
16 and 17 indicate DR A baumannii isolated from hands-free automatic tap and water mixture side of the joint tube, respectively. Lane 18 indicates a clinical isolate of drug-sensitive
A baumannii. Lane M is a Marker.
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